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Abstract:
Individual labour market transitions from unemployment into temporary work are often
succeeded by a transition from temporary into regular work. We investigate whether
temporary work increases the transition rate to regular work. In that case, temporary work
may enhance labour market efficiency. We use longitudinal survey data of individuals to
estimate a multi-state duration model, applying the ‘timing of events’ approach. To deal with
selectivity, the model incorporates transitions from unemployment to temporary jobs and
unobserved determinants of the transition rates. The data contain multiple spells in labour
market states at the individual level. We analyse the results using novel graphical
representations. The results unambiguously show that temporary jobs serve as stepping-
stones towards regular employment. They shorten the duration of unemployment and they
substantially increase the fraction of unemployed workers who have regular work within a
few years after entry into unemployment, as compared to a situation without temporary jobs.
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1.  Introduction
In many countries, the labour market has displayed an increase in flexible jobs in general,
and in temporary jobs in particular. There is an extensive debate on the extent to which such
jobs improve welfare in general and help individual workers in particular. It is often argued
that the existence of temporary work is especially beneficial to currently unemployed
workers, because it provides them opportunities to gain work experience and acquire human
capital, to deepen the attachment to the labour market, and to search more effectively for
more desirable jobs. Temporary job experience may be informative about the ability and
motivation of the individual (screening or signalling). Some studies show that employers
indeed use atypical contracts as a way of screening for permanent jobs (e.g. Storrie, 2002;
Houseman et al., 2003). In this paper we examine the extent to which temporary work
facilitates individual unemployed workers to move from unemployment to regular work, that
is, the extent to which temporary work acts as a stepping-stone towards regular work.
Our empirical analysis follows the ‘timing of events’ approach formalised by Abbring
and Van den Berg (2003). We use longitudinal survey data of individuals to estimate a multi-
state duration model. The model specifies the transition rates from unemployment to
temporary jobs, from temporary jobs to regular work, and from unemployment directly to
regular work. Each transition rate is allowed to depend on observed and unobserved
explanatory variables as well as on the elapsed time spent in the current state. To deal with
selection effects, we allow the unobserved determinants to be dependent across transition
rates. For example, if more motivated individuals have less trouble finding permanent jobs
but are also over-represented among those in temporary jobs, then a casual observer who
does not take this into account may conclude that there is a positive causal effect even if in
reality there is none.
1 We also exploit subjective responses on whether the individual desires
to have a regular job. We exploit the multi-spell nature of the data to reduce the dependence
of the results on functional form specifications. The ‘timing of events’ approach exploits
variation in observed moments of transitions in order to empirically distinguish between
causal effects and selection effects. Somewhat informally, if a transition to a temporary job is
often quickly succeeded by a transition into a regular job, for any constellation of
                                                          
1 Purcell et al. (1999), Feldman et al. (2001) and Von Hippel et al. (1997) have found low levels of motivation
among temporary workers.3
explanatory variables, then this is strong evidence of a causal effect.
2 Here we adopt the
specific model framework developed by Van den Berg, Holm and Van Ours (2002), for two
reasons. First, it allows in a natural way for ‘lock-in’ effects of temporary jobs, meaning that
they may involve a temporary standstill of search activities for other jobs. Secondly, it allows
for heterogeneous treatment effects, meaning that the effect of having a temporary job on the
transition rate to regular work may vary across observed and unobserved individual
characteristics. Because of lock-in effects and effect heterogeneity, the parameter estimates
are hard to interpret. We contribute to the methodological literature by analysing this in some
detail and by developing a graphical procedure to express the main results.
The estimation results also shed light on whether the individuals with a high
incidence and/or duration of unemployment flow into temporary work more often, and
whether they benefit more from a stepping-stone effect of temporary work. More in general,
we address whether individuals who benefit from temporary work also have a high transition
rate into temporary work. This is of importance from a policy point of view. If certain types
of individuals barely flow into temporary work although their average duration until regular
work would be substantially reduced by it, then it may be sensible to stimulate the use of
temporary work among this group, for example by helping individuals to register at
temporary work agencies.
We abstract from effects of the existence of temporary jobs on the transition rate from
unemployment directly into regular work (i.e. without intervening temporary work spell). It
can be argued that this effect is negative if a temporary job facilitates a move to a regular job
and if unemployed individuals are aware of this. However, the data do not allow for
identification of this effect. We also abstract from equilibrium effects. Temporary contracts
imply lower layoff costs and therefore stimulate employment creation (see for example
Bentolila and Bertola, 1990; Bentolila and Saint Paul, 1994; Booth, 1997; Hoffmann and
Walwei, 1999). Furthermore, the economic performance of firms may improve if there is less
need to hoard workers as an insurance against a sudden upswing in demand (Pacelli, 2002;
Kahn, 2000, Von Hippel et al., 1997). The use of temporary workers may reduce cyclical
                                                          
2 The approach does not require exclusion restrictions, instrumental variables, or conditional independence
assumptions. Recently, a number of studies have appeared in which the ‘timing of events’ approach is applied
to analyze the effects of dynamically assigned treatments on duration outcomes (see Abbring and Van den Berg,
2004, for an overview).4
swings in labour productivity, since firms might be better able to shed workers quickly
during a downturn (Estevão and Lach, 1999).
To the extent that the data allow us, we examine how job characteristics of regular
jobs depend on whether they were directly preceded by a spell of unemployment or whether
there was an intermediate spell of temporary work (see also Booth et al., 2002; Houseman,
2001).
3
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the data set, discusses some
variables that we use in the analyses, and provides descriptives. Section 3 presents the model.
The estimation results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2. Data
We use the OSA labour supply panel, which is a longitudinal dataset collected by the Dutch
Institute for Labour Studies (OSA). This dataset follows a random sample of Dutch
households over time since 1985, by way of biannual face-to-face interviews. The survey
concentrates on individuals who are between 16 and 64 years of age, and who are not full-
time students. Therefore only households with at least one person in this category are
included. All individuals in the household who fall under this category - head of the
household, partner, children and other household members - are interviewed. This results in
some 4000 individuals per wave. All households that cooperate in a wave are asked to
participate again two years later except if all household members became over 65 years of
age. An attempt is made to locate family (members) who moved. If household members
refuse to participate then the other members are surveyed anyway. If the whole household
refuses, a replacement household is approached. A replacement household matches the
refusing one by sex, age, family size and region. We use data from 1988 to 2000. The 1988
wave consists of 4464 individuals. In 1998, a quarter of them is still in the panel. In 1990,
1992, 1994, 1996, 1998 and 2000 refreshment samples were drawn, so that in 2000 the
sample size was 4185. Van den Berg and Lindeboom (1998) and Van den Berg, Lindeboom
                                                          
3 We are unable to check whether temporary work is associated with lack of training opportunities, as suggested
by Farber (1997, 1999), Arulampalam and Booth (1998), and Amuedo-Dorantes (2002).5
and Ridder (1994) study the effect of attrition in the OSA data on the estimates of the
transition rates between unemployment and employment and between jobs. They find that
although attrition is sometimes sizeable, it does not have discernible effects on the estimates
of these rates. These two studies also provide ample background information on the data as
well as references to other studies using these data.
In the OSA panel, an effort is made to collect extensive information on the labour
market histories of the individual respondents. Individuals are asked about their labour
market status two years ago - the previous interview date - about all transitions made since
then, and about the current labour market status. For every transition we observe when it
happened, why it happened, by which channel the new position was found and what the
respective labour market positions were. Regarding the labour market position after a change,
individuals can choose from: other function with same employer, employee at other
employer, self-employed, co-working partner of self-employed, no paid job but looking for
one, no paid job and not looking for one, military service, and full-time education. From
these labour market histories we obtain the sequence of labour market states occupied and the
sojourn times in these states. People are defined to be unemployed when they do not have a
job but are looking for one. One does not need to receive unemployment benefits to be
unemployed.
We define regular work as being in a job that is a permanent job or being in a job
with a limited-term contract that is supposed to become permanent. In the Netherlands,
starting on a one-year contract in a job is very common, and practically everybody gets a
subsequent offer of a permanent contract for the same job. These one-year contract jobs are
not the temporary jobs we are interested in here, since these are by definition a starting point
for regular employment. Instead, we define temporary jobs as the more contingent types of
jobs: fixed-term jobs, temporary agency work, on-call contracts and subsidised temporary
jobs. It should be noted that in the Netherlands, contrary to certain other countries,
unemployed individuals who are registered at commercial temporary work agencies but are
currently not assigned to an employer, do not receive wage income and are considered to be
unemployed. This also applies to our data.
Concerning the employment positions at the survey moments we observe the wage,
number of hours worked, industry, occupation, type of work, type of contract, etcetera. For6
periods between survey moments we have less information, and this leads to two problems.
First, we do not observe many characteristics of jobs that start and end between two
consecutive interviews. Notably, we often do not observe the wage of such jobs. This implies
that the set of explanatory variables that we can use is mostly restricted to background
characteristics of the individual (listed below). Secondly, it is not always clear whether a job
that starts and ends between two consecutive interviews is temporary or not. In case of doubt
we infer the type of contract from other variables. We use the stated channel by which the job
was found – this can be a temporary help agency – and the stated reason why transitions into
and out of the job are made – to get more job security or because of the end of contract,
respectively. In some cases these variables are missing, and we right-censor the
unemployment spell at the moment of the transition into such a job. The latter occurred in
12% of all spells.
We can then measure the duration between the start of unemployment and the
moment at which the individual moves into either regular or temporary work. This is what
we call the unemployment spell. Subsequently, we can measure the duration from the start of
a temporary job until the moment at which the individual moves to a regular job. This is what
we define to be the temporary job spell. The latter duration period may include intermittent
temporary jobs and periods of unemployment in between. All these durations may be right-
censored due to a transition to another labour market state, or due to reaching the end of the
observation window. We do not consider spells of regular employment in our model.
We do not include unemployment spells that started before the first interview, so that
there are no initial conditions problems that arise with interrupted spells. The indicated
selection results in a sample of 976 individuals. All individuals have become unemployed at
least once during the time period 1988-2000. We use up to three spells of unemployment per
individual. This results in 1175 spells.
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics of the labour market positions of
individuals at interview dates. E.g. 16 percent of the unemployed are in temporary
employment two years later. These numbers are roughly consistent with earlier findings both
in the Netherlands and other Western countries (e.g. Dekker and Kaiser, 2000; Segal and
Sullivan, 1997). Transitions from temporary jobs to regular work are frequent, and, indeed,
more frequent than transitions from unemployment to regular work. This suggests that7
temporary employment might serve as a stepping-stone towards regular work. Figure 1
shows the total number of observed labour market transitions in our subsample. Note that
some types of transitions do not play a role in the empirical analysis below, in particular the
transitions to and from ‘not in the labour force’, the transitions to unemployment, and the
transitions from regular (or permanent) employment to temporary employment.
Table 1.  Labour market transitions in our subsample, 1988-2000 (percentages).










Out of the labour force 58% 26% 7% 9%
Unemployment 22% 32% 16% 30%
Temporary employment 6% 21% 35% 38%
Regular employment 3% 18% 8% 71%
#  Transitions to unemployment are relatively frequent in our sample since we select only those who are
observed to become unemployed at least once.
A number of individual characteristics is recorded at the first interview, and an
attempt is made to keep track of changes in time-varying characteristics such as family
composition, marital status and level of education. These characteristics are used as
explanatory variables. Appendix 1 gives some sample averages. Information on the labour
market tightness, notably the unemployment/vacancy ratios per education level, is gathered
from Netherlands Statistics (CBS).8
Figure 1.  Labour market transitions in the data set
3.  The model specification
3.1. The transition rates
In the introduction of the paper we mentioned the distinguishing features of the ‘timing of
events’ methodology that we apply. We adopt the model framework of Van den Berg, Holm
and Van Ours (2002), which was constructed to study the existence of stepping-stone jobs in
the Dutch medical profession. In our context, the model specifies the transition rates from
unemployment to temporary employment, from unemployment to regular employment, and
from temporary employment to regular employment. In general, the transition rate or hazard
rate θij is defined as the rate at which an individual flows from one state i to another state j,
given that (s)he survived in state i until the current moment. We define the indices i and j to
have values: 1 = unemployment, 2 = temporary employment, and 3 = regular employment.
We specify a mixed proportional hazard model for each transition rate. Let observed
characteristics be denoted by xij and the baseline hazard by λij(.), for the transition rate from
state i to state j. In addition, βij is a vector of parameters to be estimated. The multiplicative
random effects vij are state and exit destination specific. Then,9
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Note that this imposes that the hazard rates only depend on the elapsed duration in the current
state and not on earlier outcomes.
4
Recall that we define an unemployment spell to be the time span between entry into
unemployment and entry into either regular or temporary work. A temporary job spell is
defined as the time span between the start of the first temporary job and entry into regular
employment. The total spell between the start of unemployment and regular employment is
the sum of the unemployment spell and, if applicable, the temporary job spell. In our data we
observe more than one of these ‘total’ spells per individual.
For a given individual, the values of vij are assumed to be identical across different
spells. To deal with selective inflow into temporary work and permanent work, we allow the
vij to be related for a given individual. For example, the observed transition rate from
temporary work to regular work may be higher than the observed rate from unemployment to
regular work just because individuals for whom it is easy to find regular work tend to self-
select into temporary work. Then v12 is positively related to v13 and v23. It is also possible that
persons who most easily find regular work find less easily a temporary job, which means that
v12 and v13 are negatively related.
The individual likelihood contributions are unconditional on the unobserved
heterogeneity terms (see e.g. Lancaster, 1990). With unobserved heterogeneity, the
likelihood function is not separable in the parameters of different transition rates. Abbring
and Van den Berg (2003) analyse the identification of these types of models. It turns out that
the availability of multiple spell data is useful in the sense that fewer assumptions are needed
for identification, and therefore the empirical results are less sensitive to aspects of the model
specification. See also Abbring and Van den Berg (2004) for comparisons to inference with
latent variable methods and panel data methods. In particular, in multi-spell duration
                                                          
4 With random effects, including individual past labour market outcomes as explanatory variables is difficult as
it gives rise to initial conditions problems, unless the data contain a natural starting point of each individual
labor market history. By implication, the individual treatment effects defined below do not directly depend on
e.g. past annual earnings, but at most on the observed and unobserved determinants of past outcomes.10
analysis, as in fixed effects panel data analysis, the results do not critically depend on the
assumption that observed and unobserved explanatory variables are independent.
An important condition for identification concerns the absence of anticipation of the
moment of treatment. This basically means that the individual should not know more about
the moment of treatment than is captured by the modelled distribution of the duration until
treatment. In our context, anticipation occurs for example if the individual stops looking for
regular work (or actually has an increased transition rate into regular work) upon the moment
it is decided that he will enter a temporary job in a certain time period from now. If the
researcher does not observe the moment of this decision then the estimates of current
transition rates are determined by future events. However, such a scenario seems unlikely in
the present setup, and indeed one may argue that the “no anticipation” assumption is in line
with the flexible nature of temporary work. The matching of employers and employees is a
random process, and temporary workers are often called at short notice. Against this one may
argue that some individuals are registered at temporary work agencies as looking for such
jobs, but that this is unobserved, and that these individuals may have a higher rate of moving
from unemployment to temporary work. However, this is captured as unobserved
heterogeneity. Also, the data contain an explanatory variable indicating whether the
individual, when unemployed, prefers temporary work to regular work.
3.2.  Parameterisation and quantities of interest
We follow the literature by taking the duration dependence functions (or baseline hazards)
λij(t) to have piecewise constant specifications. We subdivide a duration axis into a finite
number of intervals numbered 1,2,… from the origin onwards. Let t denote the elapsed
duration, τ refer to the successive intervals and Iτ(t) denote time-varying dummy variables
that are equal to 1 iff t is in the interval τ. The piecewise constant duration dependence
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With an increasing number of time intervals, any duration dependence pattern can be
approximated arbitrarily closely. We use 8 intervals. This captures the empirical shapes well.11
We take the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity term v to be multivariate
discrete with a finite number of mass points, and we take the locations of the mass points as
well as the associated probabilities to be unknown parameters. Each individual has a unique
set of v12,v13,v23. We allow for N different types of individuals, where a type is characterized
by a unique set of values of v12,v13,v23. Let pn with n=1,2,…,N denote probabilities that add to
1, and let vijn denote a realization of the random variable vij. The resulting family of
distributions of v is a special case of the general multivariate discrete distribution. The latter
has N possible realizations of each vij, and every combination of realizations of vij and vi*j* is
allowed, so that the vector v has N
3 possible realizations. This amounts to N
3+3N-1 unknown
parameters, which, in the light of the large number of parameters elsewhere in the model, is
less feasible even for N=2. So, following the specifications of the distribution G of v in Card
and Sullivan (1988) and Van den Berg, Holm and Van Ours (2002), we impose that
n ijn ij p v v = = ) Pr(    for all  } 23 , 13 , 12 { ∈ ij
and 
n j i j i ijn ij v v v v * * * * = ⇔ =   for all  } 23 , 13 , 12 { ,
* * ∈ j i ij
This specification of the distribution of v restricts the general multivariate distribution
by imposing some structure on the relation between the elements of v12,v13,v23, and indeed it
has only 4N-1 unknown parameters. Note that since we also allow for constant terms in the
vectors of regression coefficients, not all of these parameters are identified. Hence, we
normalise the mean of (v12,v13,v23) to be 1. This reduces the number of estimated parameters
for the distribution of v by three.
5 Note that the relation between the elements of v12,v13,v23 is
not imposed to be monotone. As noted above, the extent to which v12 is related to v13 and v23
determines the extent to which selectivity affects the relation in the raw data between having
temporary work or not on the one hand, and the rate of entering regular work on the other
hand. In the empirical analysis, we report standard errors for the estimates conditional on the
value of N.
It is not difficult to estimate slightly more general specifications of the distribution G
and use this for specification tests. Notably, we may allow for realisations of all possible
combinations of the values of v12 on the one hand and of (v13,v23) on the other.
                                                          
5 Clearly, if we would divide the states of unemployment and/or temporary employment into a number of sub-
states then the number of parameters would become too large to be able to estimate the model.12
We now examine which model quantities are informative on the treatment
6 or
stepping-stone effect. The discussion is informal and suppresses notation in terms of
counterfactual outcomes (see Abbring and Van den Berg, 2003). For expositional reasons we
briefly resort to an extension of the above model framework, allowing θ23 to depend on the
time since entry into unemployment (say, τ) as well as on the time t since entry into
temporary work. Consider an individual who became unemployed at time zero. The
treatment effect of having moved into temporary work at a given time tUE on the individual
transition rate into regular work at a time t>tUE, compared to not having entered temporary
work until and including t, equals
 θ23(t,τ|x,v23)/θ13(τ|x,v13)-1.
Note that τ=t+tUE. This treatment effect is not represented by a single model parameter, even
if v13=v23.
7 To see this, note that a zero treatment effect can only be attained if there is no
duration dependence in the transition rate from temporary work to regular work, because
otherwise the numerator varies over t whereas the denominator cannot. In other words, if
there is such duration dependence then there will be a treatment effect for at least some t.
Ruling out such duration dependence would be absurd in the light of the fact that temporary
jobs may involve a lock-in effect, causing the transition rate into regular work to be lower
right after having entered a temporary job and higher some time later. Indeed, the absence of
duration dependence is violated by the data. Also, it would be absurd to let the time variation
in the transition rate from temporary to regular work be functionally related to the time
variation in the transition rate from unemployment to regular work at the same point of time
in the counterfactual case. In our actual parameterisation, the transition rate from temporary
work to regular work depends on the time since entry into temporary work, whereas the rate
from unemployment into regular work depends on the time since entry into unemployment.
Therefore, it can be expected that the results indicate a treatment effect on the transition rate
into regular work, at least for some t.
                                                          
6 The present use of the term “treatment” is somewhat out of line with the common use, because the move into a
temporary job is to a large extent driven by the behavior of the individual under consideration.
7 The fact that we allow β13 to be different from β23 and that we allow v13/v23 to be different across individuals
means that we allow the individual effects of temporary work to differ between individuals. The average effects
can then be obtained by averaging the individual effect over x and v.13
Of course it is still interesting to examine the duration dependence patterns and
average levels of the transition rates into regular work, and the ensueing treatment effects.
For example, if for an individual with given values of x and v it always holds that
θ23(t|x,v23)>θ13(τ|x,v13), then the individual treatment effect is positive at all points of time.
However, given the complexity of the model, a quantitative assessment of the over-all effect
of temporary work is more easily studied with an outcome measure that aggregates over
effects on instantaneous transition rates. For this purpose we use the cumulative probability
of moving into a regular job, at various points of time after entry into unemployment. We
quantify these probabilities, as well as the effect of temporary work on them, by using the
estimated model. First, it is not difficult to show that the cumulative probability of moving
into regular work within t periods after having entered unemployment equals
∫ − − +
t
d t S S S S S
0
23 13 12 12 12 13 13 )) ( 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( τ τ τ τ τ θ τ τ τ θ         (1)
where the indices of S refer to the corresponding duration variable (i.e. S12 is the survivor
function of the duration from unemployment into temporary work, which is a latent variable).
The first part of the expression equals the probability of moving into regular work by way of
a direct transition from unemployment, whereas the second part equals the probability of
moving into regular work by way of temporary work. Logically, the probability of moving
into regular work directly from unemployment does not converge to 1 as t goes to infinity.
The relevant population estimate of (1) follows by integration of the total expression over the
distribution of observed and unobserved characteristics.
The decomposition of (1) into its two terms does not capture a treatment effect. To see
this, note that both terms are positive even if there is no individual treatment effect, i.e. if the
states of unemployment and temporary work are equivalent in the sense that the transition
rate from temporary work to regular work at any calendar time point equals the transition rate
from unemployment to regular work that would have prevailed at that point. One can define a
sensible treatment effect by comparing the actual magnitude of expression (1) to the
magnitude in a situation where the two transition rates into regular work are equal at any
point of time. However, as we have just seen, the latter is not covered by the model
parameterisation. Fortunately, there is an equivalent way to quantify the probability of14
moving into regular work within t periods in the absence of a treatment effect: simply impose
in (1) that the transition rate into temporary work θ12 equals zero. This holds for the general
model parameterisation where θ23 is also allowed to depend on the time τ since entry into
unemployment, as well as for our actual parameterisation. In Appendix 2 we demonstrate this
formally.
Some comments are in order. First, in the absence of temporary work, some of the
individuals who would otherwise have moved into regular work by way of a temporary job
move into regular work directly from unemployment. Therefore, the cumulative fraction of
individuals moving into regular work that we calculate exceeds the observed fraction of
individuals who move directly from unemployment into regular work. This counterfactual
cumulative probability converges to 1 as t goes to infinity. Secondly, all these calculations at
the micro level assume that on the macro level the absence of temporary jobs does not affect
the magnitude of the direct transition rate from unemployment to regular work (recall the
discussion in Section 1). There are many reasons why this assumption may be incorrect.
Notably, there may be equilibrium effects on the demand and supply of regular jobs, and
individuals may increase their search intensity for regular work.
Thirdly, it is not possible to nonparametrically test whether the curve described by (1)
is different from the curve obtained by imposing θ12=0. Of course, the curve described by (1)
can be estimated nonparametrically, using the Kaplan-Meier estimator to deal with right
censoring at the end of the observation window. However, the curve obtained by imposing
θ12=0 is counterfactual. It cannot be estimated from durations until transitions from
unemployment into regular work, because these are right-censored by actual transitions into
temporary work, and such censoring times are dependent because they depend on unobserved
heterogeneity.15
4.  Estimation results
4.1.  Stepping-stone effect
We start with the estimates of the shapes of the individual transition rates as functions of the
elapsed durations in the states under consideration. Given the initial level of a transition rate
(i.e., upon entry into the state under consideration), the shape of this rate is described by the
parameters of the duration dependence function (see the estimates in Table 2a). Figure 2
plots the individual transition rates as functions of the elapsed duration in the present state for
an individual with average observed (x) and unobserved characteristics (v), using the
estimated model.
8 Tables 2b and 2c present the parameter estimates of the covariate effects
and the unobserved heterogeneity distribution; these are discussed in detail later in this
section. These curves are informative on the individual treatment effect for the average
individual.
Evidently, from unemployment, the rate into temporary work is much smaller than
the rate into regular work. However, once in temporary employment, the rate of flowing into
regular work is larger than otherwise. This demonstrates the presence of a stepping-stone
effect. One might expect that workers who accept a temporary job are initially strongly
attached to that job, for example for contractual reasons. In some sense this is true: the
transition from temporary into regular employment substantially increases after a period of
one year.  However, even newly employed temporary workers have a higher rate into regular
work than unemployed workers. The treatment effect is unambiguously positive, regardless
of the durations at which it is evaluated.
Since the transition rate from temporary work to regular work increases during the
temporary job, the accumulation of human capital may be a major reason for employers to
prefer individuals who have occupied a temporary job. An increasing size of the social
network among employed workers may also explain this. Apparently, for prospective
employers, being in a temporary job constitutes more than just a (positive) signal that one has
been found acceptable for such a job. Of course, all transition rates are affected by conditions
                                                          
8 The average unobserved characteristics are calculated by multiplying the estimated vij‘s with the estimated
corresponding probabilities (p’s).16
in the labour market and by the behaviour of the individual and prospective employers, and
we should emphasise that in this paper we do not aim to formally estimate an economic
model that distinguishes between the roles of these factors.
Table 2a. Estimation results for the log duration dependence functions.
Unempl to temp Unempl to regular Temp to regular
3 – 6 months 0.070 (0.157) 0.307 (0.119) 0.561 (0.236)
7 – 12 months 0.023 (0.164) 0.084 (0.131) 0.472 (0.228)
13 – 18 months -0.409 (0.191) -0.117 (0.146) 0.732 (0.226)
19 – 24 months 0.332 (0.205) -0.222 (0.152) 1.300 (0.260)
25 – 36 months 0.400 (0.233) 0.256 (0.149) 1.610 (0.243)
37 – 48 months 0.059 (0.329) -0.230 (0.185) 1.789 (0.259)
> 48 months 0.319 (0.378) -0.007 (0.285) 1.166 (0.339)
Standard errors in parentheses.
















Note that the estimation results discussed above are not due to selection effects,
because we corrected for observed and unobserved heterogeneity. Estimates of a model
without unobserved heterogeneity show a much larger stepping-stone effect. This indicates a17
strong selection over the direct and indirect routes.
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We now turn to the quantification of the over-all effect of temporary work on the
cumulative probability of moving into regular work. The solid curve in Figure 3 displays the
latter probability as a function of the time since entry into unemployment. This is obtained by
using the estimated model to calculate expression (1) for each individual in the sample and
for all possible combinations of vij’s weighted by the estimated p’s, so the curves in Figure 3
estimate population fractions. Similarly, the dashed curve visualises the probability of
moving into regular work without an intermediate spell of temporary work, applying the
decomposition of expression (1). The difference between the curves estimates the actual
probability of moving to regular work by way of temporary work. After 6 months, 11 percent
of the flow into regular work consists of transitions through temporary work, while after 72
months this percentage has increased to 36.
The dashed curve in Figure 4 plots the estimated counterfactual probability of moving
into regular work if there is no temporary employment. This is obtained by imposing in18
expression (1) that the transition rate into temporary work equals zero, taking again averages
across individuals in the sample and across the vij’s. For comparison, the solid curve of
Figure 3 is repeated in Figure 4. In the absence of temporary jobs, only 55 percent (instead of
83 percent) move into regular work within five years after entry into unemployment. This
shows that the stepping-stone effect is dramatically large.
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Note that the dashed curve in Figure 4 is only marginally higher than the dashed line
in Figure 3. This reflects the fact that the transition rate into temporary work is much lower
than the transition rate from unemployment into regular work. Shutting down the temporary
work channel does not affect many unemployed individuals, so there is no massive
substitution towards the direct channel into regular work. However, in the presence of
temporary work, the individuals who manage to move into temporary work face a very high
transition rate into regular work, so that shutting down the temporary work channel implies a
much lower over-all probability of moving into regular work. In sum, not many individuals19
move into temporary work, but those who do benefit enormously from it. In the next
subsections we examine whether this result is an average result or whether it is uniformly
valid for all types of individuals.
9
4.2.  Covariate effects
Table 2b presents the covariate effects on the individual transition rates.
10 Note that a
positive sign indicates a shorter duration. The comparison of the coefficients for
“unemployment to regular” to the coefficients for “temporary to regular” is informative on
the variation of the stepping-stone effect across different types of individuals. Given the
presence of a stepping-stone effect, the comparison of the coefficients for “unemployment to
regular” to “unemployment to temporary” is informative on the relevance of this effect for
obtaining regular work. Before making these comparisons, we first discuss the coefficients
themselves.
The transition rates into regular work are higher in labour markets with many
vacancies per unemployed individual. This is generally found in the literature. However, it
does not hold for the rate into temporary work. Apparently, this rate is less sensitive to
business cycle fluctuations. Bover and Gomez (1999) found this effect for Spain as well. The
results also show that in general it is easier to become employed if one wants to work more
hours. Older unemployed individuals need more time to move into regular and temporary
positions. Individuals searching for part-time work have lower transition rates both into
regular and temporary work.
Having a partner has a strong positive effect on the direct transition from
unemployment to regular work. This effect is well known (for an overview of studies on this
issue, see Ginter and Zavodny, 2001). There is no generally accepted reason for this
phenomenon. Partners may make individuals more productive and therefore more attractive
to employers. Alternatively, individuals who are successful on the labour market may have
                                                          
9 Some recent studies consider the effect of temporary work on long run employment outcomes using models
without potentially selective unobserved heterogeneity (Amuedo-Dorantes, 2000, and Hagen, 2003). Hagen
found a stepping-stone effect of temporary work in Germany, Amuedo Dorantes found none for Spain.
Gagliarducci (2004) considers the effect of the number of temporary jobs, taking selection effects into account.20
characteristics that also make them attractive on the marriage market. The effect we find is
larger for working partners than for non-working partners, which supports the selection
hypothesis. However, men with a partner but without children have lower transition rates into
temporary work, and this suggests that such men simply focus their search effort on regular
work. Women with a working partner and women without children have higher transition
rates into temporary work. Women with a working partner are often not breadwinner and
may therefore have a lower need for job security.
Unemployed individuals who prefer temporary work to regular work do not make the
direct transition from unemployment to a regular job often. However, they have a much
higher probability of finding regular employment in succession to a temporary job. These
individuals may have a particular reason to expect a temporary job to serve as a stepping-
stone.
Men with children at home have a higher transition rate from temporary to regular
work. These men may be under high pressure to provide a satisfactory level of family income
and thus may be eager to transform their insecure temporary job into a more secure regular
position. We also find a negative effect for men with a partner, perhaps indicating that having
a partner reduces the urgency for provision of a satisfactory level of family income by the
man alone.
What do the covariate effects imply for the magnitude of the stepping-stone effect for
different types of individuals? From a policy point of view, it is particularly interesting to
focus on disadvantaged groups, notably ethnic minorities – defined as the four largest groups
originating from Surinam, Dutch Antilles, Morocco and Turkey – and women. For example,
according to Netherlands Statistics ethnic minorities have unemployment rates that are more
than twice as large as native Dutch individuals – in 2002: 7.7 versus 3.3 percent. The
stepping-stone effect may be larger for ethnic minorities if employers who are reluctant to
hire ethnic minorities can screen them by way of a temporary contract. In that case, it makes
sense to stimulate unemployed immigrants to register at temporary work agencies.
                                                                                                                                                                                   
10 There are no observed transitions from temporary work to regular work by women with a non-working
partner.21
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Standard errors in parentheses. * indicates two-sided significance at a 10% level, ** at a 5% level22
Table 2b shows that the direct transition rate to regular work is lower for ethnic
minorities, while the transition rate from temporary to regular employment is much higher
for them. This indicates a stepping-stone effect that is much higher than average and much
higher than for natives. Note that the standard errors are large, and the estimated coefficients
are insignificant. This may reflect the small number of ethnic minorities in the sample.
However, we do observe a significantly negative coefficient for the transition rate into
temporary work. So, because ethnic minorities do not get temporary jobs very often, they do
not benefit from any stepping-stone effect. As a result, the over-all probability of moving into
regular work is substantially lower than for natives. Clearly, this suggests that it may be
interesting to study policy measures that stimulate the use of temporary work by ethnic
minorities, for example by helping them to register at temporary work agencies.
Because of the interaction terms with gender in the parameterised model it is hard to
draw conclusions on the difference between men and women from Table 2b. Therefore we
resort to a graphical analysis analogous to Figures 3 and 4 above (see Figure 5, which is the
analogue of Figure 3). There is little difference between men and women in the stepping-
stone effect of temporary jobs. Females have lower probabilities of finding regular jobs, but
the effect of having a temporary job is about the same, and so is the use of the temporary
work channel.
Contrasting singles and individuals who live with a partner gives very pronounced
differences in outcomes. As noted before, it is generally found in the literature that singles
have a weaker labour market position, and this is reflected by the fact that they have a lower
probability of moving directly into regular work. However, for singles the stepping-stone
effect is much larger, and the probability that they benefit from it is also much larger, so that
as a result they often obtain regular work through temporary work. Apparently, the flexibility
associated with being single goes well together with the flexibility associated with temporary
work.
Another informative characteristic concerns whether the individual prefers temporary
work over regular work upon entering unemployment. If the latter holds then it takes more
time to move directly into regular work, but the stepping-stone effect is very large. This is
plausible: such individuals are presumably aware of the size of the effect.23
Figure 5. Estimated probability of moving to regular work, directly or through temporary
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In general, despite the variation in the magnitude of the effect across workers, the
effect is positive for virtually all types of workers that we can distinguish on the basis of
observed characteristics, including those with a relatively weak labour market position.
4.3. Unobserved  heterogeneity
Table 2c presents the estimates of the parameters of the unobserved heterogeneity
distribution. These concern the general specification discussed in Section 3, allowing for
realisations of all possible combinations of the value of the unobserved heterogeneity term in
the transition rate from unemployment to temporary work on the one hand, and the values of
the unobserved heterogeneity terms in the other transition rates on the other. This results in
four types of individual values of the vector of unobserved heterogeneity terms (see Table24
2c). Only two groups have a substantial size, and if we remove the negligible Types 1 and 4
we again obtain the basic specification that we discussed in Section 3.
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Standard errors in parentheses. * indicates two-sided significance at a 10% level, ** at a 5% level.
As always in models with unobserved heterogeneity, the heterogeneity distribution
estimates are difficult to interpret. First, they are determined by the set of included
covariates. Secondly, the discrete heterogeneity distribution should be interpreted as an
approximation of the true distribution. Keeping this in mind, note that Type 2 individuals
have a lower probability to find regular work directly from unemployment but a higher
probability to find temporary work, whereas for Type 3 it is the other way around. Type 2
individuals have a high stepping-stone effect. For Type 3 individuals v23<v13,  so their
stepping-stone effect is smaller, and for certain elapsed durations and covariates it is small in
absolute value. The variances and correlations of the unobserved heterogeneity terms are all
significantly different from zero. This implies that a model that does not take the selection
into temporary work into account is misspecified and leads to incorrect inference on the
stepping-stone effect.
In general, the main results are robust with respect to a range of model specification
features like the set of included covariates, the duration dependence intervals, and the
numbers of mass points of the heterogeneity distribution.25
4.4.  Quality of jobs found
A limitation of analyses of treatment effects on unemployment durations is that they typically
ignore effects on the type and quality of the accepted job. Unfortunately, our data do not
allow us to address this issue in detail either, since the wages that are earned, the hours
worked, and the fringe benefits are not observed. The dataset only supplies job characteristics
at survey dates of jobs held at survey dates, but it does not supply job characteristics at the
moment of job acceptance, and it does not supply characteristics of jobs held in between
survey dates. However, the data allow us to address the stability of the jobs. Ideally, this
would have to be included in the duration model above. But our number of observations is
limited, and inclusion of two other transitions, from temporary jobs to unemployment and
from regular jobs to unemployment, is unfeasible. For this reason, we simply estimate
duration models for the duration of the regular job, where the way it is found - directly or by
way of temporary employment - is used as an explanatory variable (see Appendix 3).
The results indicate that the duration of the regular job does not depend on whether it
is directly preceded by a temporary job or by unemployment. Simple t-tests also show that
the reason why people separate from the regular job does not differ significantly between
directly and indirectly found regular jobs. Regarding the exit state we do see a slight
difference: jobs found by way of temporary employment end less often in unemployment and
more often into a transition to another temporary job. However, this difference is not
statistically significant. Together, this does not suggest that the jobs found by way of
temporary work are very different from those found directly from unemployment.
5.  Conclusion
Temporary work serves as a stepping-stone towards regular work. Having obtained a
temporary job means that the transition rate into regular work is higher than in
unemployment. The average effect is positive regardless of the durations at which it is
evaluated. It increases in the time since flowing into temporary work, suggesting that being
in a temporary job constitutes more than just a (positive) signal that one has been found26
acceptable for such a job. All these results are obtained while correcting for selection effects
associated with moving into temporary work.
The transition rate into temporary work is substantially lower than the transition rate
from unemployment into regular work. Shutting down the temporary work channel does not
affect many unemployed individuals, so there is no massive substitution towards the direct
channel into regular work. However, those individuals who manage to move into temporary
work in general face a very high subsequent transition rate into regular work. In sum, not
many individuals move into temporary work, but those who do strongly benefit from it. As a
result, the over-all probability of moving into regular work within say five years after entry
into unemployment is substantially increased by the presence of temporary work.
The above effects are positive for virtually all workers, including workers with a
relatively weak labour market position. Ethnic minorities have a high stepping-stone effect
on the transition rate to regular work but they rarely flow into temporary jobs, so they do not
benefit from the effect. This suggests that it may be interesting to examine policy measures
that stimulate the use of temporary work by ethnic minorities, for example by helping them
to register at temporary work agencies.
We should re-emphasize that we abstract from potentially negative effects of the
existence of temporary jobs on the transition rate from unemployment directly into regular
work (i.e. without intervening temporary job spell). We also abstract from equilibrium effects
of a general increase in (the number of individuals in) temporary work. The introduction lists
literature pointing towards beneficial equilibrium effects on profits and employment of
policy interventions that facilitate the creation of temporary jobs. The effect of temporary
work on the rate of moving to regular work may decrease if firms replace regular jobs by
temporary jobs. Indeed, because of congestion, it may even decrease if both types of jobs are
created but the number of workers in temporary jobs increases faster than the number of
regular jobs.27
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Appendix 1. Sample statistics of explanatory variables
Table A1. Sample averages of explanatory variables
variable average
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   No children at home
   Man with children at home





   Single
   Man with working partner
   Woman with working partner
   Man with non-working partner






Desired number of working hours    32
Temp job preferred (at start unemployment) 0.07
Vacancies/Unemployment ratio 0.1931
Appendix 2. The treatment effect on the probability of moving into regular work
Consider the model extension where θ23 depends on the time t since entry into temporary
work as well as on the current time τ=t+tUE since entry into unemployment, where t UE
denotes the moment of the transition into temporary work, so θ23:=θ23(t,τ). We define
S23(t,tUE) as the survival function of the duration in temporary work if the transition into in
temporary work occurs at tUE, so
) ) , ( exp( ) , (
0
23 23 dz z t z t t S UE
t
UE + − = ∫θ
We have to modify expression (1) accordingly, to
∫ − − +
t
d t S S S S S
0
23 13 12 12 12 13 13 )) , ( 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( τ τ τ τ τ τ θ τ τ τ θ (2)
Absence of treatment effects means that for all t and τ there holds that θ23(t,τ)=θ13(τ). This
implies that S23(t-τ,τ)= S13(t)/S13(τ). If we substitute this into expression (2) and elaborate on
this then we simply obtain S13(t). The latter is also obtained if we substitute into (2) that
θ12=0. (Notice that the first parts of expressions (1) and (2) do not change when imposing
that for all t and τ there holds that θ23(t,τ)=θ13(τ).)32
Appendix 3. Analysis of the quality of the regular job






Intercept 3.842 0.307 3.788 0.279
Female -0.216 0.256 0.223 0.234
Ethnic minority 0.277 0.515 0.255 0.470
Job found indirectly 0.1946 0.181 0.173 0.165
Education
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Re-entrant 0.200 0.310 0.193 0.282
Children at home
   Man with children at home










   Man with working partner
   Woman with working partner
   Man with non-working partner

















Log Likelihood -563.54 -565.26
* significant at 5%-level
destination Regular job found by way of
temporary job
Regular job found directly from
unemployment
Other regular job 67% 67%
Temporary job 23% 15%
Unemployed 4% * 12% *
Out of the labour force 4% 3%
Unknown 2% 4%
* difference significant at 5%-level   
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